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Use Of "Like/Love" Slogans In
Advertising: Is The Trademark Owner
Protected?
Advertisements which mention a competitor's product by name
have become very popular. Many of those advertisements use the
slogan, "If you Like [Their Product], You'll Love [Our ProductI."
Courts differ as to whether a trademark owner can gain protection
from the unauthorized use of its trademark in a "like/love" slo-
gan. This Comment suggests that the slogans do not constitute
comparative advertising and should be enjoined under the likeli-
hood of confusion doctrine. This Comment further suggests that
courts should consider application of the dilution doctrine in con-
sidering these slogans.
[The merchant's! mark is his authentic seal; by it he vouches for the goods
which bear it; it carries his name for good or ill. If another uses it, he
borrows the owner's reputation, whose quality no longer lies within his own
control. This is an injury, even though the borrower does not tarnish it, or
divert any sales by its use;for a reputation, like a face, is the symbol of its
possessor and creator, and another can use it only as a mask. Judge
Learned Hand.'
I. INTRODUCTION
A trademark is any word, symbol, device, or combination of these,
used by a manufacturer or a merchant, to identify his goods and to
distinguish them from goods of another.' Trademarks play a crucial
role in society by helping consumers identify the products they wish
to purchase. Trademarks reduce the cost of shopping and simplify
the making of purchasing decisions. In addition, because trademarks
allow consumers to identify and purchase those products which have
previously satisfied them, trademarks encourage the production of
1. Yale Elec. Corp. v. Robertson, 26 F.2d 972, 974 (2d Cir. 1928).
2. Willis, The Life and Death of a Trademark, in CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN
TRADEMARK LAW AND UNFAIR COMPETITION 1988, at 7 (1988).
quality products.3
Because trademarks play such an important role in a free market
economy, they are afforded legal protection. Well-known trademarks
present inviting targets for new manufacturers hoping for immediate
consumer loyalty. Trademark law seeks to rid the market of the
"free rider" who attempts to benefit from the reputation of a com-
petitor by deceiving consumers about the source and quality of the
advertised product. "If such an infringer is not enjoinable, the qual-
ity encouragement function [of the trademark] is destroyed. If all
may take a free ride on the successful seller's mark and reputation,
there is no incentive to distinguish one's own goods and services.
The law of trademarks is founded upon an unstable base of com-
peting policies. First, there is the policy to protect consumers from
confusing and misleading advertising. Second, there is the policy to
protect property, where the property interest is the entrepreneur's
investment in the goodwill and reputation of the trade name. Finally,
there is the policy to promote economic efficiency so that the free
workings of competition may benefit the consuming public. These
policies often conflict with each other, making it necessary for the
courts to balance the interests and equities involved.5
To add further uncertainty to the area of trademark law, there is
a body of law which protects "comparative advertising." When an
advertisement compares one product to a competing product in a
truthful, non-deceiving manner, use of that comparison cannot be
enjoined by the competitor. A comparative advertisement may even
mention the competing product by its trademark. Trademark owners
do not have absolute protection from any unauthorized use of their
trademarks. They are only protected from use in a false, misleading,
or otherwise confusing advertisement.
A series of recent cases raises difficult issues about balancing the
three competing policies and defining the scope of comparative ad-
vertising. The cases have all involved the same question: whether the
owner of a well-known trademark can enjoin a copier of the popular
product from advertising the copy with the slogan, "If you like [their
product], you'll love [our product]." Although the "like/love" cases
3. 1 J.T. MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 2:1 (2d ed.
1984 & Supp. 1988).
4. Id.
5. "Since an unfair competition suit involves the public's interest in protection
against deceit as to the sources of its purchases, the businessman's right to enjoy business
earned through investment in the good will and reputation attached to a trade name, and
the interest of others in not being restrained from free use of trade names because of
mere token use on the part of one, the court is called upon . . . to balance these equities
and interests. .. ." National Color Laboratories, Inc. v. Philip's Foto Co., 273 F. Supp.
1002, 1004 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
6. "Like/love" hereafter refers to the advertising slogan, "If you like [Product
X], you'll love [Product Y]."
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have involved only perfume advertisements, such advertising lends
itself to almost all consumer products. For instance, a like/love slo-
gan could be effectively used to advertise almost any disposable con-
sumer good - those goods about which the consumer makes a quick
buying decision without taking time to research the options. Goods
falling into that category could include food items, household cleans-
ers and detergents, small appliances, and personal hygiene products.'
Because of the adaptability of the like/love slogan, there is growing
concern, both in the legal and advertising communities, over how far
such use of a competitor's trademark can go before a court will find
trademark infringement.
In Saxony Products, Inc. v. Guerlain, Inc.,9 the copier advertised
its copy of Guerlain's "SHALIMAR" perfume with the slogan, "If
you like SHALIMAR, you'll love Fragrance S."'1 The Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals found no likelihood of confusion by the use of the
slogan, and thus, refused to enjoin its use. In Calvin Klein Cosmetics
Corp. v. Parfums de Coeur, Ltd.," the Eighth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals allowed the copier to advertise with the slogan, "If you like
OBSESSION, you'll love CONFESS,"12 if used with a source-iden-
tifying disclaimer. However, in Charles of the Ritz Group Ltd. v.
Quality King Distributors, Inc., 3 the Second Circuit Court of Ap-
peals enjoined the use of the slogan, "If you like OPIUM, you'll love
OMNI," 4 finding it confusing even when displayed with a
disclaimer.
This Comment examines the differing analyses and conclusions of
the three like/love cases in the context of balancing the competing
policies involved. The Comment will point out the differing focuses
of the courts in determining if like/love slogans involve trademark
infringement. The Comment first considers the three policies under-
lying trademark law. Then the like/love cases will be analyzed under
7. The like/love slogan is less likely to be used to advertise more expensive con-
sumer goods, like automobiles and major appliances, because consumers do not usually
buy those products on-the-spot.
8. Makers of a generic version of "Perfect Nail" fingernail conditioner listed
their product on a comparison chart which boasted, "If You Like the Name Brand,
You'll Love the GENERIC BRAND." Sykes Laboratory, Inc. v. Kalvin, 610 F. Supp.
849, 852 (D.C. Cal. 1985). The plaintiffs did not allege trademark infringement based on
use of that slogan.
9. 513 F.2d 716 (9th Cir. 1975).
10. Id. at 718.
11. 824 F.2d 665 (8th Cir. 1987).
12. Id. at 667.
13. 832 F.2d 1317 (2d Cir. 1987).
14. Id. at 1318.
the two doctrines of trademark protection: the traditional confusion
doctrine and the less prevalent dilution doctrine. This Comment fur-
ther analyzes the like/love slogans under the law of comparative ad-
vertising and suggests that courts may have improperly labeled the
slogans as "comparative." Next, this Comment examines the role
policy plays in the like/love cases and suggests that policy considera-
tions account for the differing outcomes. The Comment concludes
that the like/love slogan itself is confusing and should be enjoined.
Although a careful advertiser can dispel some of the confusion by
surrounding the slogan with information concerning the source of the
products, many consumers will never read the "fine print." In future
decisions, the courts should focus more on the like/love slogan itself,
recognizing that the slogan may be all a consumer will ever read.
II. COMPETING POLICIES UNDERLYING TRADEMARK PROTECTION
A. The Policy To Prevent Confusion
An important policy underlying the law of trademarks is protec-
tion of consumers from confusing and misleading advertising. The
Supreme Court has held that the consumer has an inherent right to
be protected from deception and confusion. 15 The Court has stated
that "the public is entitled to get what it chooses, though the choice
may be dictated by caprice or by fashion or perhaps by ignorance."16
The Court has recognized that consumers may choose certain prod-
ucts motivated only by habit, and that they have the right to do so.
A system that does not provide trademark protection would give
manufacturers a free reign to trick consumers into thinking they are
buying a different product. The Court's holding prohibits any mis-
representation designed to break consumer habits, even if the buyer
will be more satisfied with the product received."
The policy to protect consumers from misleading and confusing
advertising acts as the basic support for the likelihood of confusion
doctrine.' 8 Consumers should be permitted to recognize the products
with which they are satisfied and to avoid those which they consider
to be inferior. "By ensuring correct information in the marketplace,
the [trademark] laws reduce losses caused by misunderstanding and
deceit and thus permit consumers and merchants to maximize their
own welfare confident that the information presented is truthful." 9
15. See I J.T. MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 2:13 (citing FTC v. Algoma Lumber
Co., 291 U.S. 67, 78 (1934)).
16. FTC v. Algoma Lumber Co., 291 U.S. 67, 78 (1934).
17. FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 389 (1965).
18. See infra text accompanying notes 118-26.
19. Falcon Rice Mill, Inc. v. Community Rice Mill, Inc., 725 F.2d 336, 348 (5th
Cir. 1984).
The argument has been made that any confusion from free use of a competitor's trade-
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The courts ensure that the marketplace is providing correct informa-
tion to consumers by measuring the likelihood that a product or an
advertisement will confuse consumers. This likelihood of confusion
test serves as the foundation of most trademark infringement cases.
B. The Policy of Property Protection
Trademarks are not in the public domain of unprotected words,
and therefore, they are not subject to the broad protection of free
speech. 0 So, while the courts want our market to be fundamentally
competitive, they recognize the right to own property in business
marks.
The theory that there may be property rights in trademarks was
first recognized by an English court in 1838 in Millington v. Fox."'
Nonetheless, in 1857 it was said to be "settled law that there is no
property whatever in a trademark." 22 That law did not remain "set-
tled" for long; the courts' views of the property right in trademarks
frequently flip-flopped.
In the United States, the concept of trademarks as property re-
mains vague and unsettled. Many courts follow the traditional
"Holmes-Hand Doctrine" that trademarks are not property. A
"trademark never really gives any property in the words themselves
.... "23 The Doctrine considers a trademark to be only a symbol of
the goodwill of the trademark owner's business, giving the owner the
marks would actually benefit the public. If a competitor confuses the public into thinking
his lower priced product is the same as the established product, the public will benefit by
getting an equal product at a lower price. This theory requires that the products be made
of exactly the same ingredients. Standard Brands, Inc. v. Smidler, 151 F.2d 34 (2d Cir.
1945) (Frank, J., concurring). The Supreme Court, however, struck down this argument
in FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374 (1965) holding that misrepresentation of
any fact which may materially induce a purchaser's decision to buy is a deception pro-
hibited by section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act regardless of the irrationality
of the purchaser's decision.
20. See I J.T. MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 1:15; Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders
Inc. v. Scoreboard Posters, Inc., 600 F.2d 1184, 1188 (5th Cir. 1979) ("The First
Amendment is not a license to trammel on legally recognized rights in intellectual prop-
erty"); see also Compeo Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 237 (1964);
Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 228 (1964).
21. 3 My & Cr 338, 40 Eng. Rep. 956, 962 (Ch. 1838).
22. Collins Co. v. Brown, 3 K & J 423, 69 Eng. Rep. 1174, 1176 (V.C. 1857).
For more on the development of trademark cases with respect to property rights, see 3 R.
CALLMANN, UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES § 17.07 (4th ed.
1983 & Supp. 1988).
23. Durable Toy & Novelty Corp. v. J. Chein & Co., 133 F.2d 853, 854 (2d Cir.
1943).
right to prevent confusion.24
However, the assertion that a trademark gives a right only to pre-
vent confusion ignores the intrinsic value of a trademark. A trade-
mark acts as a guarantee of the product's quality and as a medium
for its advertisement. Further, it indicates the common origin of
products, aids consumers in immediate recognition of the product
they desire, and helps sell a product by giving it a certain market
appeal. These characteristics of a trademark often are developed at
considerable time and expense to the trademark owner. Presumably,
because of that time and expense, many courts will recognize the
property interest in a trademark. The more distinctive and popular
the mark, the more the courts are willing to protect it as the manu-
facturer's property.
Recently, in San Francisco Arts & Athletics v. United States
Olympic Committee,5 the United States Supreme Court advanced
the concept of trademark ownership as a property right. In finding
that the United States Olympic Committee's ("USOC") exclusive
right under the United States Code to use the word "Olympic"26 was
not in violation of the first amendment, the Court stated: "National
protection of trademarks is desirable. . . because trademarks foster
competition and the maintenance of quality by securing to the pro-
ducer the benefits of good reputation.12 7
Congress had granted to the USOC the exclusive right to use the
word "Olympic," partially to give the USOC the benefit of its own
efforts. That benefit was to act as an incentive for the USOC to
continue production of a quality product that benefits the public."8
The Court recognized the danger that suppression of particular
words could suppress ideas. However, that danger was balanced
against the principle that "when a word acquires value as the result
of organization and the expenditure of labor, skill and money by an
entity, that entity constitutionally may obtain a limited property
right in the word."29
24. See Industrial Rayon Corp. v. Dutchess Underwear Corp., 92 F.2d 33 (2d
Cir. 1937); Standard Brands, Inc. v. Smidler, 151 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1945) (Frank, J.,
concurring); Monsanto Chem. Co. v. Perfect Fit Prods. Mfg. Co., 349 F.2d 389 (2d Cir.
1965). See also 3 R. CALLMANN, supra note 22, § 17.07 n.30.
25. 483 U.S. 522 (1987).
26. Amateur Sports Act of 1978, 36 U.S.C. § 380 (1982).
27. San Francisco Arts & Athletics, 483 U.S. at 531 (quoting Park 'N Fly, Inc.
v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 198 (1985)).
28. Id. at 537. Congress has also granted exclusive use of other distinctive words
and symbols. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 705 (1982) (badge or medal of veterans' organiza-
tions); § 706 (Red Cross); § 707 (4H club emblem); § 711 ("Smokey Bear" character or
name); § 71 Ia ("Woodsey Owl" character, name, or slogan); § 713 (Seal of the United
States and the President and Vice President) (1976). See also 36 U.S.C. § 27 (Boy
Scouts); § 36 (Girl Scouts); § 1086 (Little League Baseball); § 3305 (American Na-
tional Theater and Academy) (1988).
29. San Francisco Arts & Athletics, 483 U.S. at 532 (quoting International
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The federal statute expressly granting exclusive rights to the
"Olympic" mark does not require that there be a likelihood of confu-
sion. The Court found that" when an entity is granted exclusive use
by Congress under those circumstances, that entity is not required to
prove that an unauthorized use of the word is likely to cause confu-
sion.30 Therefore, Congress can grant exclusive use of a trademark
where it can reasonably conclude that most commercial uses of the
word are likely to be confusing, or likely to harm the entity by dilut-
ing the mark.31
The property right in a trademark also finds support in the dilu-
tion statutes adopted in many states.32 The dilution statutes ex-
pressly protect trademarks even from non-confusing uses. The dilu-
tion doctrine, which will be discussed more fully later, recognizes
that any use of a trademark, other than by its owner, may damage
the public's ability to associate that trademark with the trademark
owner's product.3 3 Courts can, under a dilution statute, effectively
extend the trademark owner's property rights to protect the informa-
tional value of the trademark from "dilution" caused by unautho-
rized uses.
The policy of property protection is not inconsistent with the pol-
icy of avoiding confusion. Both will tend to protect the trademark
owner. However, focus on the property values may expand the trade-
mark owner's rights where likelihood of confusion is minimal, or
even non-existent.
C. The Policy To Promote Free Competition
The third policy underlying the law of trademarks is the promo-
tion of, free competition. This is a strong public policy for two pri-
mary reasons. First, our economy is based on the premise that the
public has a right to chose the products it wants to purchase. Sec-
ond, free competition lowers product prices and in some cases in-
creases product quality.34 Trademarks play an important role in the
News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 239 (1918)).
30. Protection only extends to use of the word in commercial speech. Id. at 535.
31. Id. at 539.
32. "The underlying rationale of the dilution doctrine is that the gradual diminu-
tion or whittling away of the value of a trademark, resulting from use by another, consti-
tutes an invasion of the senior user's property right and good will in his mark and gives
rise to an independent wrong." 2 J.T. MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 24.13(A), at 213. For
a list of states which have adopted a dilution statute, see id. § 24.13(B), at 216 n.18.
33. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Kodak Cycle Co., 15 R.P.C. 105 (1898).
34. The underlying assumption is that pressures of competition tend to keep
107
world of competing products. Identification of product source and
quality is the essence of competition.35 Trademarks encourage the
production of quality products by securing to the producer the bene-
fits of the good reputation which high quality creates. "To protect
trademarks, therefore . . . is to foster fair competition ....
This policy to promote competition seeks to increase the number
of available products on the market; in direct contrast, the policy to
protect consumers from confusion works to limit consumer choices.
Promoters of free competition point out that if new products were
prevented from entering the market, the existing product would be-
come monopolistic. 37 That is, the incumbent manufacturer, having
the whole market to itself, would have no incentive to increase the
quality of its product or to keep the product's price down. As a re-
sult, quality would decrease and prices would rise. 8
The policy to promote competition also lies in direct conflict with
the policy to protect property rights. In fact, the policy to promote
competition is often manifested in judicial resistance to recognizing
any property value in trademarks. It is well established, under the
law of comparative advertising, that one who copies a product sold
under another trademark may use that rival trademark in advertise-
ments to identify the product copied. 9 The Supreme Court has
stated that every reproducer has "a right to tell the public what they
are doing, and to get whatever share they can in the popularity of
the [product] by advertising that they are trying to make the same
article, and think that they [have] succeed[ed]. '"4° Courts feel that
extending protection of a trademark beyond protecting its function
of source identification 41 would create serious anti-competitive conse-
quences while providing little compensating public benefit.42
prices down to the lowest level at which a seller can realize a profit. The law of supply
and demand will also work to keep quality and efficiency high and costs low. 1 J.T.
MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 2.5.
35. Id.
36. Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1946 U.S.
CODE CONG & ADMIN. NEWS 1275 (Senate Committee on Patents reporting what would
become the Federal Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act))).
37. A "monopoly" occurs when a seller has some degree of control over prices.
The monopolist is a "price maker" rather than a "price taker." See 1 J.T. MCCARTHY,
supra note 3, § 1.16 at 40.
38. "There is little disagreement that a profit-maximizing monopolist will main-
tain his prices higher and his output lower [than] the socially optimal levels that would
prevail in a purely competitive market." Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603
F.2d 263, 272 (2d Cir. 1979).
39. Smith v. Chanel, Inc., 402 F.2d 562, 563 (9th Cir. 1968).
40. Id. at 564 (quoting Justice Holmes in Saxlehner v. Wagner, 216 U.S. 375,
380.81 (1910)).
41. Plaintiff argued that protection should be extended to the trademark's func-
tion of embodying consumer goodwill created through extensive, skillful, and costly ad-
vertising. Smith, 402 F.2d at 566.
42. Id. at 566-67. Anticompetitive consequences would result at first, when a con-
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Thus, supporters of the policy to promote competition will en-
courage use of trademarks in comparative advertising. Truthful com-
parative advertising will allow a new producer to gain position in the
market and still remain competitive. By being able to advertise a
product as "better than" or "just as good as, only cheaper," a new
competitor will not fall victim to the expensive exercise of trying to
capture the public's attention in a new product.4 3 If each new pro-
ducer were forced to spend large amounts of money on alternative
advertising, the cost would be reflected in the product's price, and
the producer would lose its competitive edge.
To promote competition in the marketplace, courts want to allow
competitors to use trademarks owned by others in their advertising.44
Use of a trademark to identify the competing product is an effective
way to present comparative product information to the public so that
more rational purchase decisions can be made.4 5 While courts favor-
sumer becomes conditioned to buy a product merely because of the trademark's market
appeal. Then consumer choices are not based on quality or price, and the competitive
system fails to perform its function of allocating available resources efficiently. See -
CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION 270-74 (1933); J.S. BAIN,
BARRIERS TO NEW COMPETITION 114-15 (1962); Livermore, On Uses of a Competitor's
Trademark, 20 STAN. L. REV. 448, 449-50 (1968) and authorities cited therein; See also
Timberg, Trade-Marks, Monopoly, and the Restraint of Competition, 14 LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROBS. 323 (1949); Auerbach, Quality Standards, Informative Labeling, and
Grade Labeling, 14 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 362 (1949); Treece, Protectability of
Product Differentiation, 18 RUTGERS L. REV. 1019, 1020-22 (1964). Additionally, the
success of irrational consumer allegiances acts as a barrier to the entry of new competi-
tion into the market. Barriers to entry tend to produce monopolistic profits. See J.S.
BAIN, supra note 42, at 116, 142, 216.
The Supreme Court has noted the anticompetitive consequences of barriers to new
entry created by extensive trademarks advertising. FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386
U.S. 568, 578-79 (1967).
43. "If a product is selling at a premium because consumers have been mesmer-
ized by its advertising, let a newcomer tell consumers that his product is just as good, but
costs less." Nye, In Defense of Truthful Comparative Advertising, 67 TRADEMARK REP.
353, 357 (1977).
44. "The public interest in competition ordinarily outweighs the interest in secur-
ing to a person the rewards of his ingenuity in making his product attractive to purchas-
ers." West Point Mfg. Co. v. Detroit Stamping Co., 222 F.2d 581, 589 (6th Cir. 1955),
cert. denied, 350 U.S. 840 (1955); Tas-T-Nut Co. v. Variety Nut & Date Co., 245 F.2d
3, 5 (6th Cir. 1957). Use of another's mark must be truthful. Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §
1125(a) (1982).
45. Smith, 402 F.2d at 563 (a trademark can be used to identify the product
copied); Hypertherm, Inc. v. Precision Products, Inc, 832 F.2d 697, 700 (1st Cir. 1987),
("[One] may ordinarily use the originator's trademark descriptively ...."); Calvin
Klein, 824 F.2d at 668 (trademark can be used to "win over" consumers interested in a
lower cost copy); Livermore, supra note 42, at 458 (allowing competitors to use trade-
marks will allow consumers to choose between competing products based on economic
grounds).
ing a liberal policy toward use of a competitor's trademark in com-
parative advertising agree that such use can be enjoined if there is a
likelihood of confusion, focus on the policy favoring competition
tends to disfavor the trademark owner where the likelihood of confu-
sion is marginal.
III. THE LIKE/LOVE CASES
A. The Comparative Advertising Approach - Saxony
In Saxony Products, Inc. v. Guerlain, Inc.,46 the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals viewed the like/love slogan as pure comparative
advertising.47 The court relied on an earlier case, Smith v. Chanel,48
which held that one who has copied an unpatented product sold
under a trademark may use the trademark in advertising to identify
his or her product.49 Saxony had produced and marketed a line of
toiletries called "LIKE PERFUMES, ' 50 made to smell like more ex-
pensive and well-known perfumes. 5 1 In its advertising displays, Sax-
ony listed Guerlain's trademark, "SHALIMAR," in one column and
"Fragrance S," Saxony's similar fragrance, in a matching column.
The slogan on the comparison charts read, "If you like
SHALIMAR, You'll love Fragrance S."' 52 The court found no likeli-
hood of consumer confusion and thus no infringement of Guerlain's
"SHALIMAR" trademark. 3 The court noted that most of the com-
parison charts, display bins, signs, labels, and boxes predominantly
46. 513 F.2d 716 (9th Cir. 1975).
47. For purposes of comparative advertising, Saxony could use Guerlain's trade-
mark in a "like/love" slogan to apprise consumers that the products are similar. Id. at
722.
48. 402 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1968).
49. Id. at 563.
50. Saxony (maker of the imposter perfume) filed suit against Guerlain (maker of
the well-known perfume) alleging unfair competition after Guerlain asked one of Sax-
ony's customers to remove Saxony's displays from its stores. Guerlain felt that Saxony's
displays constituted an infringement on its "SHALIMAR" trademark. Guerlain then
counterclaimed for trademark infringement, dilution, misrepresentation, and unfair com-
petition. Saxony, 513 F.2d at 718.
51. It is well-established that one may copy the unpatented formula of another's
products. Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 237-38 (1964); Sears,
Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 231-33 (1964); Saxlehner v. Wagner, 216
U.S. 375, 380 (1910); Smith, 402 F.2d at 563; Viavi Co. v. Vimedia Co., 245 F. 289,
292 (8th Cir. 1917).
52. Saxony, 513 F.2d at 718.
53. Id. at 723. The court ruled that summary judgment was proper on the issue
of likelihood of confusion, but reversed the summary judgment and remanded for deter-
mination of whether Saxony falsely represented that Fragrance S is like or similar to
SHALIMAR. Id.
A useful summary of the criteria for trademark infringement, with citations of author-
ity, is found in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 717 (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1963). For
the infringement of a federally registered trademark, see the Lanham Trade-Mark Act §
32(l), 15 U.S.C. § 1114(l).
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identified Saxony as the source of Fragrance S.54 Further, only the
Saxony company name appeared on the packaging of Fragrance S.55
From this evidence, the court concluded that "no reasonable cus-
tomer could mistake the source of the advertised goods by believing
they were manufactured by [Saxony] .'"5 Guerlain offered no evi-
dence to show any actual confusion. 7
B. The Surrounding Circumstances Approach - Calvin Klein
In Calvin Klein Cosmetics Corp. v. Parfums de Coeur, Ltd.,55 the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals found no likelihood of confusion
created by the like/love slogan. The court did not focus solely on the
like/love slogan, but rather examined the overall context in which
that phrase appeared. The facts were similar to those in Saxony; the
defendant manufactured and marketed a copy of Calvin Klein's
"OBSESSION" perfume, called "CONFESS." Parfums de Coeur's
body spray container displayed the slogan, "If you like OBSES-
SION, you'll love CONFESS." Some body spray containers were
sold with an accompanying store display that bore the slogan, "If
you like OBSESSION by CALVIN KLEIN, you'll love CON-
FESS. '59 Near the bottom of the store display appeared the words
"Designer Imposters by Parfums de Coeur. 60
The district court preliminarily enjoined distribution or sale of the
body spray container because "information on the body spray
container viewed as a whole was ambiguous and did not provide suf-
54. Saxony, 513 F.2d at 718. The court offered no examples of how Saxony iden-
tified itself as the source of Fragrance S. It is noted, however, that advertising said to be
misleading was discontinued in 1971. Id. at 723.
55. Id. at 718.
56. Id. at 723. See B&T Sales Assoc. v. H. Daroff & Sons, Inc., 421 F.2d 352
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 952 (1970). For more on who constitutes the reasonable
consumer, see 2 J.T. MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 23.27.
57. Saxony, 513 F.2d at 723. Proof of merely the "likelihood of confusion" is
necessary in an action for infringement. Actual confusion is not required, but acts as
strong proof of the likelihood of confusion. "Actual confusion need not be shown in a suit
for equitable relief." Chevron Chem. Co. v. Voluntary Purchasing Groups, Inc., 659 F.2d
695, 704 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1126 (1982). "[a]lthough it must be
proved to recover damages under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act." Faloon Rice Mill v.
Community Rice Mill, 725 F.2d 336, 345 (1984) (citing Frisch's Restaurants, Inc. v.
Elby's Big Boys, Inc., 670 F.2d 642, 647 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 916 (1982));
see also 2 J.T. MCCARTHY, supra note 3, §§ 23.1, 23.2.
58. 824 F.2d 665 (8th Cir. 1987).
59. In both slogans, the word "CONFESS" is printed in bolder type than the
other words, and the terms "OBSESSION" and "CALVIN KLEIN" are both denoted
as registered marks with the trademark symbol. Id. at 667.
60. Id.
ficient information for the consumer to adequately compare the two
products, thus creating a likelihood of consumer confusion as to the
source or origin of CONFESS and its relationship to OBSES-
SION.""1 It did not, however, enjoin the use of the like/love slogan
itself, but indicated instead that the slogan could be used if accom-
panied by a source-identifying disclaimer. Parfums de Coeur then
attached a disclaimer to the body spray container which bore the
words "Designer Imposters," "Designer Quality Fragrances, Not
Designer Prices," and "Parfums de Coeur. ' ' 62 The court accepted
that disclaimer in a modified order. The district court also refused to
preliminarily enjoin the store display, finding that it adequately in-
formed consumers as to the source of CONFESS. 3
On appeal, petitioner Calvin Klein contended that distribution of
all products and displays should be enjoined. The Eighth Circuit
found, however, that the district court did not err in denying prelimi-
nary injunctive relief as to the store display. 4 The appellate court
also affirmed the district court's modified order allowing the body
spray container to be sold with the disclaimer attached to the
container body.65
By enjoining distribution of the body spray container absent any
disclaimer, the district court found that the like/love slogan used by
itself was ambiguous.6  "[W]hile the slogan does invite consumers to
compare CONFESS with OBSESSION, the spray container as a
whole was insufficient to denote the source of CONFESS as a
Parfums de Coeur, not a Calvin Klein, product. 67 Either the pro-
posed disclaimer or the phrase at the bottom of the display was con-
sidered legally adequate to cure any confusion as to the source of the
product.6 8 The court felt that information regarding the source of
the advertised product, if it appeared on the same display or
61. Id.
62. Id. at 669. Calvin Klein also appealed an order denying a motion for injunc-
tive relief to enjoin Parfums de Coeur's distribution of scented strips of paper coated with
the CONFESS fragrance in discount store Christmas catalogues. The scent strips de-
picted a spray cologne bottle and package that did not carry disclaimer language. The
appellate court affirmed the order, first because the discount retail outlets were com-
pletely distant from the quality department store venues where Calvin Klein marketed
OBSESSION, and second, because recalling the catalogues would be an exercise in futil-
ity. Id. at 671.
63. Id. at 667.
64. Id. at 668-69.
65. The appellate court did not pass on the merits of Calvin Klein's trademark
infringement action, but held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in deny-
ing preliminary injunctive relief. Id. at 671. One of the factors to be considered in grant-
ing a motion for a preliminary injunction is the probability that the movant will succeed
on the merits. Id. at 667. For other factors, see id.; Dataphase Sys., Inc. v. C.L. Sys.,
Inc., 640 F.2d 109, 114 (8th Cir. 1981).
66. Calvin Klein, 824 F.2d at 670.
67. Id. at 668 (emphasis added).
68. Id.
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container as the like/love slogan, would be readily noticed by aver-
age consumers. 9 The court found that to be acceptable, the dis-
claimer language must state that CONFESS is an imposter, or that
it is not an OBSESSION product. Either was sufficient to dispel any
confusion.7 °
C. The Factors of Confusion Approach - Charles of the Ritz
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals found a likelihood of confu-
sion in Charles of The Ritz Group Ltd. v. Quality King Distribu-
tors, Inc.71 The plaintiff manufactured a line of fragrance products
which it sold under the trademark "OPIUM." Defendant Deborah
International Beauty, Ltd. ("Deborah") manufactured a scent simi-
lar to OPIUM, labeled "OMNI." OMNI was sold with a tab pro-
jecting from the top of each package bearing the slogan, "If You
Like OPIUM, a fragrance by Yves St. Laurent, You'll Love OMNI,
a fragrance by Deborah International Beauty. Yves St. Laurent and
Opium are not related in any manner to Deborah International
Beauty and Omni. '' 72 The trial court enjoined the use of the slogan
and disclaimer on the ground that even when used together, they
were inadequate to obviate consumer confusion. 3 The appellate
court affirmed. 4 Identification of the two different manufacturers in
the like/love slogan itself would make the slogan in Charles of the
Ritz less likely to cause confusion than the slogans in Saxony or
Calvin Klein. However, the Charles of the Ritz court found a likeli-
69. The disclaimer sticker attached to the Parfums de Coeur boxes did tend to
draw attention to itself. Id. at 671. Also, the phrase on the display adequately informed
consumers as to the source of CONFESS. Id. at 667.
70. Id. at 671.
71. 832 F.2d 1317 (2d Cir. 1987).
72. Plaintiff also claimed that OMNI's package design infringed on plaintiff's
trade dress which itself has been registered as a trademark. The trial court agreed that
the packages were similar, but not sufficiently similar to warrant a preliminary injunc-
tion. Plaintiff offered no evidence that consumers were actually confused by the package
designs. Charles of the Ritz Group Ltd. v. Quality King Distrib., Inc., 636 F. Supp. 433,
438 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
73. At issue on appeal was the third version of this slogan. The district court
issued an injunction against Deborah's original slogan, "If You Like OPIUM, You'll
Love OMNI," used in conjunction with the disclaimer, "Opium is a Registered Trade-
mark Parfum and is not related in any manner with Deborah International Beauty, Ltd."
The court found that the disclaimer's placement (hidden inside the box) suggested a
calculated effort to escape liability for infringement. Charles of the Ritz, 832 F.2d at
1319-20. Similarly, the trial court rejected Deborah's second version, "If You Like
OPIUM, a fragrance by Yves St. Laurent, You'll Love OMNI, a fragrance by Deborah
Int'l Beauty," noting that it left the relationship between the companies and trademarks
completely ambiguous. Id. at 1320.
74. Id. at 1318.
hood of confusion with the slogan and disclaimer based on factors
enumerated in Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Electronics Corp.75
In Polaroid, Judge Friendly enumerated eight factors to aid the
trier of fact in determining if the unauthorized use of a trademark
causes a likelihood of confusion: (1) the strength of the mark; (2)
the degree of similarity between the two marks; (3) the proximity of
the products which may cause a mistaken assumption that the two
products are associated with one another; (4) the likelihood that the
prior owner will bridge the gap and compete directly in the same
market; (5) actual confusion; (6) the defendant's lack of good faith
in adopting a mark similar to plaintiff's; (7) the quality of defen-
dant's product; and (8) the sophistication of the buyers.7 6 Variations
of these eight factors have become the generally accepted guidelines
in all federal circuits, to be balanced whenever there is a question of
confusion concerning unauthorized use of trademarks.77
The Charles of the Ritz court held that six of the eight Polaroid
factors weighed in favor of finding a likelihood of confusion. The
"OPIUM" mark78 was found to be a strong mark;7 9 there was a high
degree of similarity between the two products; the products could be
found at the same stores; Charles of the Ritz could opt to compete in
the "mass" perfume market; evidence established actual confusion; 0
and Deborah was found to have intentionally copied OPIUM.81 In
75. 287 F.2d 492 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 820 (1961).
76. Id. at 495.
77. Fletcher, The Trademark Forum, 71 TRADEMARK REP. 641, 641 (1981).
"Most courts today approach likelihood of confusion as a conclusion determined from
weighing a number of factors." Id.
For variations of the Polaroid factors see Miss World (UK), Ltd. v. Mrs. America
Pageants, Inc., 856 F.2d 1445, 1448 (9th Cir. 1988); Wynn Oil Co. v. Thomas, 839 F.2d
1183, 1186 (6th Cir. 1988); Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397, 399 (8th
Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 326 (1988); Wesco Mfg., Inc. v. Tropical Attractions
of Palm Beach, Inc., 833 F.2d 1484, 1488 (11th Cir. 1987); Oreck Corp. v. United
States Floor Sys., Inc., 803 F.2d 166, 170 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1069
(1987); Pizzeria Uno Corp. v. Temple, 747 F.2d 1522, 1527 (4th Cir. 1984); Pignons S.
A. de Mecanique v. Polaroid Corp., 657 F.2d 482, 487 (1st Cir. 1981); Skukn-Fun Prod-
ucts, Inc. v. Suntan Research & Dev., Inc., 656 F.2d 186, 189 (5th Cir. 1981); Donsco,
Inc. v. Casper Corp., 587 F.2d 602, 605 (3d Cir. 1978); Union Carbide Corp. v. Ever-
Ready Inc., 531 F.2d 366, 381-82 (7th Cir.) (superseded by statute on another issue),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 830 (1976).
78. "Mark" is used interchangeably with "trademark."
79. "OPIUM" is an arbitrary mark, which is the most highly protected class of
trademarks. Evidence also showed that OPIUM has a very high degree of commercial
success. Charles of the Ritz, 832 F.2d at 1321.
80. Charles of the Ritz offered evidence that the display was positioned in one
drugstore such that a person of average height (5'4") could not read the disclaimer. The
court based its decision in part on the fact that Deborah failed to introduce evidence that
the disclaimer actually lessened consumer confusion. The court also considered the differ-
ence in type size on the disclaimer. Id. at 1322.
81. Intentional copying raises a presumption of an intention to create a confusing
similarity. Id. at 1322; Mobil Oil Corp. v. Pegasus Petroleum Corp., 818 F.2d 254, 258
(2d Cir. 1987).
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support of reducing confusion, the court found that the "marked dif-
ference in quality of the two products lessen[ed] the likelihood of
consumer's misapprehending the source of either product. '82 More-
over, the sophistication of buyers who spend up to $100 for an ounce
of perfume would mitigate against the likelihood of confusion.8 3
While these last two Polaroid factors supported Deborah, the other
factors overwhelmingly outweighed those concerns and led the court
to hold that a likelihood of confusion existed.84
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE LIKE/LOVE CASES
Thus, each of the three appellate courts used a different approach
in analyzing the like/love case before it. With the "comparative ad-
vertising" approach taken by the Saxony court, a court does not look
critically at likelihood of confusion, but presumes that the trademark
is mentioned to compare the two products. The "surrounding cir-
cumstances" approach taken by the Calvin Klein court recognizes
that the slogan is ambiguous. This approach then considers whether
disclaimers or manners of display effectively dispel any confusion
created by the ambiguous slogan. Finally, there is the "factors of
confusion" approach taken by the Charles of the Ritz court. This
final approach analyzes the slogan by balancing a number of factors
designed to determine if a likelihood of confusion exists. This ap-
proach ignores the effect of any disclaimer language unless the in-
fringer can demonstrate that a disclaimer would significantly reduce
the likelihood of confusion.
A. Analysis Under the Law of Comparative Advertising
The basic technique of comparative advertising is used to compare
one product to its competitor. The objective is to send out the mes-
sage to consumers that "mine is better."85 Currently, comparative
advertising is a popular trend in advertising. 6 Initially, the tech-
nique entailed comparing one's product to "Brand X." Today, how-
82. Charles of the Ritz, 832 F.2d at 1323.
83. Id.
84. See infra text accompanying notes 129-54.
85. Comment, To Tell the Truth: Comparative Advertising and Lanham Act
Section 43(a), 36 CATH. U.L. REV. 565, 565 (1987). See generally Lee, Comparative
Advertising, Commercial Disparagement and False Advertising, 71 TRADEMARK REP.
620, 620-25 (1981).
86. Corporate advertising comprised three percent of all television advertising in
1973 and eight percent in 1975. Lee, supra note 85, at 621.
ever, the established competing products are named expressly or by
inference, 87 and they are directly compared with the advertiser's
products. 8
1. Background of Comparative Advertising
In Smith v. Chanel,89 Smith advertised a fragrance called "Sec-
ond Chance" as a duplicate of Chanel's "Chanel No. 5." The adver-
tisement invited customers to compare the two fragrances by stating,
"We dare you to try to detect any difference between Chanel #5
(25.00) and Ta'Ron's 2nd Chance. $7.00.''90 The Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals held such advertising may not be enjoined by the
judiciary under either statutory91 or common law92 so long as the
advertisement does not create a reasonable likelihood of confusion as
to the source, identity, or sponsorship of the advertiser's product.93
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) actively encourages com-
parative advertising. 4 The FTC views comparative advertising as an
effective way to present relevant product information to the con-
sumer. Further, the FTC suggests that this advertising technique
promotes competition, product improvement, and innovation, and
can lead to lower prices in the market.9 5 Failure to allow compara-
87. For example, in Avis advertisements, Avis would compare themselves to "No.
1." It was known to most consumers that "No. 1" was Hertz. Another technique is to
cover only the product name on a distinctive package so that consumers will recognize
the "other product."
88. Conlon, Comparative Advertising: Whatever Happened to "Brand X"?, 57
CHI. BAR REC. 118 (1975), reprinted in 67 TRADEMARK REP. 407 (1977). This genre of
advertising can prove to be very successful. For example, after the first year of the Avis
slogan, "We Try Harder" than "No. 1" (referring obviously to Hertz), Avis reported its
first net profit in 15 years. Lee, supra note 85, at 621; see also Sterk, The Law of Com-
parative Advertising: How Much Worse Is "Better" Than "Great," 67 TRADEMARK REP.
368, 368 n.4 (1977).
89. 402 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1968).
90. Smith, 402 F.2d at 563. The advertisement appeared in a trade journal di-
rected to wholesale purchasers. The "challenge" was suggested to be used in conjunction
with a "Blindfold Test."
91. Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a).
92. Common law unfair competition is grounded in either deception or appropria-
tion of the exclusive property of the plaintiff. Smith, 402 F.2d at 565.
93. Id. at 563. Use of a trademark in advertising a copy will also constitute in-
fringement if the advertisement contains misleading information.
94. Lee, supra note 85, at 621. The FTC regulates all advertising presented
through the media, whether it be through television, radio, newspaper, or magazine.
95. Id. See Comment, supra note 85, citing 2 S. KANWIT REGULATORY MANUAL
SERIES, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION § 22.17 n.13 (1985). The FTC policy statement on
comparative advertising provides:
The Commission has supported the use of brand comparisons where the bases
of comparison are clearly identified. Comparative advertising when truthful
and nondeceptive, is a source of important information to consumers and as-
sists them in making rational purchase decisions. Comparative advertising en-
courages product improvement and innovation, and can lead to lower prices in
the marketplace. For these reasons, the Commission will continue to scrutinize
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tive advertising is seen as a barrier to competition in the market-
place. 6 The FTC fears that a competitor with a lower priced prod-
uct will be prohibited from entering the market because it is unable
to spend the advertising dollars to overcome consumer loyalties to
existing brands. If the competitor is forced to spend the advertising
dollars to introduce its competing product, it will have to raise
prices. Therefore, comparative advertising is the easiest way for a
competitor to inform consumers that an alternative product is offered
at a lower price."
Comparative advertising, however, has created many problems in-
volving trademark infringement, unfair competition, product dispar-
agement, deceptive trade practices, and false advertising.98 Critics of
comparative advertising are numerous. They contend that compara-
tive advertising, by creating an association between the advertised
product and the trademark of the compared product, is inherently
confusing to consumers.9 9 In addition, a trademark owner can suffer
diminution of hard-earned goodwill if the purchaser is dissatisfied
with the advertised product. According to the critics, the harm to the
trademark owner outweighs any supposed public benefit.100
Despite such skeptical commentary, advertisers have a constitu-
tional right to compare products. Comparative advertising is in ac-
cord with the fundamental objectives of the first amendment so long
as the advertiser seeks not to induce confusion, but rather to contrast
the products. 10' The trademark owner is afforded court protection
from comparative advertising involving false or misleading language
under various types of actions.102 When advertisers elect to compare
carefully restraints upon its use.
Id.
96. Livermore, supra note 42, at 450-53.
97. For more, see J.S. BAIN, supra note 42, at 114; Livermore, supra note 42, at
450.
98. Lee, supra note 85, at 623.
99. Robin & Barnaby, Comparative Advertising: A Skeptical View, 67 TRADE-
MARK REP. 358, 361-62 (1977). Comparative advertising creates an association between
the advertised product and the trademark of the compared product, giving it an inherent
potential to mislead. The public may remember the ad but forget which was the adver-
tised product, or may associate the claims of one product with another, or may even
assume a relationship between the sources of the two. Id. at 361-62.
100. See generally Robin & Barnaby, supra note 99.
101. Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 445 F. Supp.
875, 881-84 (S.D. Fla. 1978).
102. For instance, "an advertiser may find that he has committed a common law
tort, violated a state or federal statute, or failed to comply with FTC standards." Sterk,
supra note 88, at 370. For more on the various types of actions available to remedy
comparative advertising abuses, see id.
their products with competitive products, they assume the responsi-
bility of putting forth truthful and accurate representations about
the competitive product. It must be clear to the consumer, and ulti-
mately to the court, that the other product is a competitor and not
simply another one of the advertiser's products. 113 Advertising that
confuses the potential purchaser is not afforded first amendment
protection.0 4
There is no clear line between "comparative" and "non-compara-
tive" advertising.105 The guidelines for comparative advertising
adopted by the American Association of Advertising Agencies ("4-
A") endeavor to give a practical indication of when advertising is
truly comparative. The 4-A guidelines were adopted for use in the
advertising and broadcasting industries to promote and ensure stan-
dards of accuracy and fairness in comparative advertising.0 6 "[The]
guidelines . . . provide: (1) the 'intent and connotation' of [the] ad
should be to inform ...(3) [the] competition should be identified
'properly and fairly' . . . (5) the identification 'should be for honest
comparison purposes and not simply to upgrade by association'
... .1$07 Although the like/love cases'08 do not discuss the 4-A
guidelines, these guidelines can aid in examining whether like/love
slogans really are comparative.
2. Comparative Advertising and the Like/Love Slogan
The Saxony court suggests that the like/love slogan is actually a
form of comparative advertising and should, therefore, be analyzed
under the law of comparative advertising. 09 Like the court-deemed
clearly "comparative" advertisments, the like/love slogans explicitly
name the competitor's product; but, unlike a comparative advertise-
ment, the like/love slogans do not offer any express words of com-
parison. For example, it is unclear if one will "love" the product
103. Some products are advertised by a comparison to a previously produced prod-
uct, for example, "If you like X, you'll love new improved X."
104. LA R. CALLMANN, supra note 22, § 5.50.
105. Advertisements will range from those that clearly compare the product to a
named competitor; to those which compare to Brand X, where Brand X is not clearly
identifiable; to those at the furthest end of the spectrum that do not mention any other
product. Sterk, supra note 88, at 369.
106. Lee, supra note 85, at 639-40.
107. Id. at 639. After television networks agreed to allow comparative advertising,
they each adopted a similar set of guidelines to avoid abuses. For more on the guidelines
adopted by each, see id.
108. See supra notes 9, 11, 13 and accompanying text.
109. "[F]or purposes of comparative advertising Saxony could use Guerlain's
trademark, SHALIMAR to apprise consumers that Fragrance S is 'LIKE' or 'similar' to
SHALIMAR." Saxony, 513 F.2d at 722. The Calvin Klein court required that to be
comparative, the like/love slogan must be accompanied by an appropriate disclaimer in-
dicating the source of the advertised product. The slogan itself was said to be ambiguous.
Calvin Klein, 824 F.2d at 671.
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because it smells better, or because it smells almost as good and is
much cheaper. The slogan, thus, offers no comparative information
by which consumers could be aided in making their purchase deci-
sions. Pure comparative advertising campaigns clearly state how the
advertised product tops the competition.
The like/love slogans are also problematic in that they do not
fairly and adequately identify the competition. The purpose of com-
parative advertising is to compare and contrast the products clearly,
not to create confusion. 10 However, unless the relationship between
the two products is identified in the slogan, confusion is likely. A
disclaimer is unlikely to clear up any confusion because consumers
do not often read disclaimers."' Even if consumers read the dis-
claimer, it is unlikely that they will realize that the two products are
competitors." 2
Thus, the issue becomes whether the imposters are really trying to
compare their perfumes to the well-known brands, or are simply try-
ing to ride on the coattails of the other brand's fame and goodwill.
Manufacturers may use advertisements to endow their products with
psychological appeal wholly independent of product quality."a3 Ad-
vertisers may not poach upon the commercial magnetism of another
product without actually comparing the two products."l Although
110. Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 445 F. Supp.
875, 881-84 (S.D. Fla. 1978). In fact, an advertiser who creates confusion can harm his
sales volume by causing people to buy the other product thinking it is the advertised
product. Robin & Barnaby, supra note 99, at 366.
111. Jacoby & Raskopf, Disclaimers in Trademark Infringement Litigatiorn More
Trouble Than They Are Worth?, 76 TRADEMARK REP. 35, 54 (1986) (Disclaimers which
employ negator words such as "no" or "not" are generally ineffective).
112. "Even when single sentence disclosure statements have been carefully crafted
by well intentioned FTC Commission attorneys, the potential for miscomprehension has
been shown to be great." Id. at 56 (footnote omitted). It is also highly possible that a
consumer will read only part of a disclaimer and notice only the name of the competitor
or the phrase "sponsored by [competitor]" and thus absorb the opposite of the message
the disclaimer attempts to put across. Id. at 55; see also Radin, Disclaimers as a Rem-
edy for Trademark Infringement: Inadequacies and Alternatives, 76 TRADEMARK REP.
59 (1986).
113. Livermore, supra note 42, at 449.
114. Id. at 449 n.6 (quoting Justice Frankfurter, "If another poaches upon the
commercial magnetism of the symbol [the trademark owner] has created, the owner can
obtain legal redress." Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316
U.S. 203, 205 (1942)). In McDonalds Corp. v. Gunvill, 441 F. Supp. 71 (N.D. I11. 1977),
the defendant, Monks Pub, advertised its "Monkburgers" on an outdoor sign on which
the "M" resembled plaintiff's famous "golden arches." The sign contained the slogan,
"Less Than 25 Billion Sold." Defendants argued that their use of plaintiff's mark was
lawful because it constituted comparative advertising. The court found no indication that
comparative advertising was involved, stating, "[tihe sign in question does not compare
the products or services provided by the plaintiff with those of defendants." Id. at 74.
the perfume copiers could be trying to honestly compare their prod-
ucts with the well-known perfumes, it is more likely that they are
trying to upgrade by creating an association between the two prod-
ucts. An inexpensive perfume in the drug stores does not have the
market appeal of an expensive, well-known perfume.
When the Saxony court categorized the like/love slogan as com-
parative, finding that the like/love slogan could be used to "apprise
consumers that Fragrance S is 'LIKE' or 'similar' to
SHALIMAR," 115 the court misinterpreted the meaning of the word
"like" in the slogan. The court's finding identified "like" as an adjec-
tive, meaning "similar." That reading of the slogan is proper in the
court's analysis of Guerlain's claim that Saxony falsely represented
Fragrance S to be similar to SHALIMAR. However, that reading is
misplaced in the court's consideration of whether the slogan is
designed to confuse the public as to the origin of Fragrance S. If the
slogan is read to say that Fragrance S is similar to SHALIMAR, it
is no wonder the court felt that the slogan was a form of compara-
tive advertising.
Both the "surrounding circumstances" and "factors of confusion"
approaches recognize that the like/love slogan alone lacks the com-
parative qualities of true comparative advertising. The Calvin Klein
court found that the like/love slogan is ambiguous and does not pro-
vide sufficient information for the consumer to adequately compare
the two products.' In Charles of the Ritz, the court found that the
slogan "raised a substantial likelihood of confusion regarding the
source of the product.""17 If the slogan is ambiguous, it should be
removed from the comparative advertising genre. Advertising which
is truly comparative and advertising which tends to confuse the con-
sumer are mutually exclusive. Advertising can only be considered
comparative if it does not create a reasonable likelihood that custom-
ers will be confused.
B. Analysis Under the Confusion Doctrine
The ultimate test for trademark infringement is whether use of the
established mark by the competitor creates a likelihood that pur-
chasers will be confused as to the source of the advertiser's prod-
uct,' 18 Likelihood of confusion is central to the law of unfair compe-
Thus, the defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint was denied.
115. Saxony, 513 F.2d at 722 ("for purposes of comparative advertising Saxony
could use Guerlain's trademark SHALIMAR to apprise consumers that Fragrance S is
'LIKE' or 'similar' to SHALIMAR").
116. Calvin Klein, 824 F.2d at 667. The district court found the slogan was ambig-
uous, although it said that the slogan did "invite" customers to compare. Id. at 668.
117. Charles of the Ritz, 832 F.2d at 1320.
118. McDonalds Corp., 441 F. Supp. at 74; Stix Prods., Inc. v. United Merchants
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tition, the purpose of which is to prevent one person from passing off
his goods or business as those of another. 119
1. Background of the Confusion Doctrine
Courts have dispensed with the requirement that a trademark
owner show actual confusion, and have focused instead on the likeli-
hood of confusion. 120 The likelihood of confusion test was incorpo-
rated by legislatures into the Lanham Act as well as into state trade-
mark statutes.' 2 ' The test focuses not only on the likelihood of the
consumer confusing one product for another, but also on the likeli-
hood that the consumer would believe the two products are derived
from a common source. Thus, the test encompasses confusion re-
gardless of whether or not competition exists between the
products. 22
In the majority of federal circuits, whether there is a likelihood of
confusion is a legal conclusion based on underlying questions of
fact. 23 Courts have developed certain guidelines to aid the finder of
fact in determining how far a valid trademark shall be protected
from its unauthorized use in advertising other goods, or from confu-
sion created by similarly named goods. Judge Friendly, in Polaroid
& Mfrs. Inc, 295 F. Supp. 479, 485 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). "[C]onfusion to the public is the
essence of both trademark infringement . . . and unfair competition." Dart Drug Corp.
v. Schering Corp., 320 F.2d 745, 748 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
119. Standard Oil Co. of N.M. v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 56 F.2d 973, 977
(10th Cir. 1932).
120. "One does not have to await the consumption of threatened injury to obtain
preventive relief. If the injury is certainly impending, that is enough." Id. at 976 (quot-
ing Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 593 (1923)).
121. 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a) (1982); see Comment, Trademark Parody: A Fair
Use and First Amendment Analysis, 72 VA. L. REV. 1079, 1083 n.20 (1986), reprinted in
77 TRADEMARK' REP. 177, 181 n.20 (1987).
122. "[C]ompetition is not necessary between the parties for there to be a likeli-
hood of confusion." 2 J.T. MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 24.4(A).
123. Comment, Likelihood of Confusion under the Lanham Act: A Question of
Fact, Law, or Both?, 73 Ky. L.J. 235, 246 (1984-85); see Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. v.
Novak, 836 F.2d 397, 398 (8th Cir. 1987) (the district court's finding is subject to the
"clearly erroneous" standard), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 326 (1988); Miss Universe, Inc. v.
Patricelli, 408 F.2d 506 (2d Cir. 1969) (to the extent that the determination of likelihood
of confusion rests on factors not involving comparison of the marks themselves, the dis-
trict court's findings are subject to the "clearly erroneous" standard normally applicable
to findings of fact); Sykes Laboratory, Inc. v. Kalvin, 610 F. Supp. 849, 860 (D.C. Cal.
1985) ("In this circuit a determination of likelihood of confusion is 'a conclusion of law
premised on an analysis of a number of subsidiary factors .... '" (quoting Lindy Pen
Co. v. Bic Pen Corp., 725 F.2d 1240, 1243 (9th Cir. 1984))); see also 2 J.T. MCCARTHY,
supra note 3, § 23:22(a) ("Traditionally, the law classified likelihood of confusion as an
issue of fact.").
Corp. v. Poloroid Electronics Corp.,1 24 was the first to enumerate
factors to be weighed in determining the likelihood of confusion.
"Where the products are different, the prior owner's chance of suc-
cess is a function of many variables .... ,,125 The list of those vari-
ables is discussed in the previous section looking at the "factors of
confusion" approach.126 Judge Friendly intended the factors to be
flexible, recognizing that the list is not exhaustive and that courts
may take other variables into account.1 27 However, each circuit court
of appeals has adopted the Polaroid factors or developed its own ver-
sion of those factors, and those factors have become the general
guidelines for determining if a likelihood of confusion exists between
two products or the origin of those products. 128
2. Likelihood of Confusion From Like/Love Slogans
The "comparative advertising" approach to analysis of like/love
slogans does not apply any version of the Polaroid factors. The Sax-
ony court found that since Saxony was identified on the labels of
boxes and bottles in which Saxony's products were sold, "no reason-
able customer could mistake the source of the advertised goods by
believing they were manufactured by [Guerlain]."29
The district court in Calvin Klein applied a version of the Polar-
oid factors1 30 in determining whether there was a likelihood of con-
fusion. After weighing those factors, the court found that while the
slogan, "If you like OBSESSION by CALVIN KLEIN, You'll love
CONFESS," did invite consumers to compare CONFESS with OB-
SESSION, the slogan by itself did not identify the source of CON-
FESS as a Parfums de Coeur, not a Calvin Klein product. 1 ' The
court further found, however, that any likelihood of confusion cre-
ated by the like/love slogan could be cured by a disclaimer such as,
"Designer Imposters by Parfums de Coeur." ' 2
124. 287 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1961); see also supra notes 75-77 and accompanying
text.
125. Poloroid, 287 F.2d at 495.
126. See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
127. Poloroid, 287 F.2d at 495. Falcon Rice Mills v. Community Rice Mill, 725
F.2d 336 (5th Cir. 1984), applied a somewhat different set of factors. See id. at 345 n.9
for case examples using different factors. "[I]t is clear that some of the factors are more
important than others and that they may have different weight in different cases. In re
Dupont, 476 F.2d 1357, 1362 (C.C.P.A. 1973). The weight to be given to the various
factors is a matter for the factfinder." Falcon, 725 F.2d at 345 n.9.
128. Fletcher, supra note 77, at 641-42; see also supra note 77.
129. Saxony, 513 F.2d at 723. For a description of the exhibits, see id. at 718.
130. In Calvin Klein, the district court applied factors from SquirtCo. v. Seven-Up
Co., 628 F.2d 1086, 1091 (8th Cir. 1980). Calvin Klein, 824 F.2d at 668.
131. Calvin Klein, 824 F.2d at 668.
132. Id. The disclaimer must be placed in a prominent place on the container. Thedistrict court did not accept a redesigned container which had the disclaimer placed on a
sticker on the product's cap, because the like/love slogan remained as the dominant por-
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The "factors of confusion" approach taken in Charles of the Ritz
balanced the eight Polaroid factors and found a likelihood of confu-
sion as to the source of Deborah's product. The court found a likeli-
hood of confusion even though the like/love slogan contained the
names of both manufacturers and was immediately followed by a
disclaimer stating that "Yves Saint Laurent and Opium are not re-
lated in any manner to Deborah Int'l Beauty and Omni. '
Consideration of each of the factors enumerated in Polaroid
suggests the like/love slogan does create a likelihood of confusion as
to the source of the products.
a. Strength of the Mark
The first factor suggested in Polaroid is the strength of the mark.
This factor refers to the "mark's distinctiveness, 'or more precisely,
its tendency to identify the goods sold under the mark as emanating
from a particular, although possibly anonymous, source.' "13 Coined
marks and arbitrary marks are the two strongest and most highly
protected classes of trademarks.3 5 Coined marks are marks which
have no independent meaning, such as "Exxon," "Kodak," and
"Clorox." Arbitrary marks are those "which have a dictionary
meaning but have no actual connection to the product,"'1 6 such as
"Tide." Less strong marks are those which are suggestive of the
product, like "Arrid," "Ivory," or "Coppertone," and the weakest
mark is that which is descriptive, like "Pudding Pops," or "Shake 'N
Bake."31 37
The Charles of the Ritz court found "Opium" to be an arbitrary
mark, and thus, among the strongest of marks. 3 8 Likewise, the Cal-
vin Klein court recognized the "OBSESSION" mark's "strength as
a widely recognized trademark."'39 The Saxony court, however, left
some question as to its view of the strength of the "SHALIMAR"
tion of the container. Calvin Klein Cosmetics Corp. v. Parfums de Coeur, Ltd., I
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 2d 1156, 1158 (D.C. Minn. 1986), affd, 824 F.2d 665 (8th Cir. 1987).
133. Charles of the Ritz, 832 F.2d at 1318.
134. Id. at 1321 (quoting McGregor-Doniger, Inc. v. Drizzle Inc., 559 F.2d 1126,
1131 (2d Cir. 1979)).
135. 1 J.T. MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 11.2.
136. Willis, supra note 2, at 10.
137. Id. The category of arbitrary marks includes "Camel" and "Mustang." Sug-
gestive marks allude to an association, while descriptive marks directly describe the prod-
uct or its qualities.
138. Charles of the Ritz, 832 F.2d at 1321. The strength of the mark was rein-
forced by evidence of its commercial success.
139. Calvin Klein, 824 F.2d at 668.
mark. The lower court in Saxony held that "SHALIMAR" was a
fragrance description as well as a trademark. Upon review, the ap-
pellate court chose not to review that conclusion because it was un-
important to its decision whether "SHALIMAR" was both a fra-
grance and a trademark, or strictly a trademark. 40 The Saxony
court failed to explicitly recognize that "SHALIMAR" is an inher-
ently distinctive mark that should be afforded a high degree of judi-
cial protection. The word "SHALIMAR" has no independent mean-
ing, and thus, would mean nothing to people unfamiliar with the
product.141 Therefore, it should have been recognized as a coined
mark and afforded a greater degree of protection.
b. Degree of Similarity Between the Marks
The degree of similarity between the two marks is another Polar-
oid factor. The Charles of the Ritz court felt that similarity was
clear because Deborah used the "OPIUM" trademark and simulta-
neously mimicked OPIUM's trade dress and scent. 42 Similarly, the
Calvin Klein court took into account the close relationship between
CONFESS and OBSESSION products. 143 The Saxony court, on the
other hand, felt that the degree of similarity between the products
supported the finding that Saxony could use Guerlain's
"SHALIMAR" trademark. That court found that one who copies
the product of another has a right to tell consumers what product
has been copied.14 4
c. Proximity of the Products
In considering the third Polaroid factor, proximity of the prod-
ucts, the concern is that consumers may mistakenly assume the cop-
ies are also made by the trademark owner or are associated with the
trademark owner's products in some other way. 145 The Charles of
the Ritz court was concerned that the two products could be found
in the same stores. Given the physical proximity, the court found
that the differences in display methods did not eliminate "the likeli-
140. Saxony, 513 F.2d at 722 n.17. "For purposes of comparison, Saxony in either
case may use the trademark SHALIMAR to identify the nature of its product." Id.
141. Words which describe the characteristics of a product by simile or metaphor
may also be descriptive. See Standard Paint Co. v. Trinidad Asphalt Mfg. Co., 220 U.S.
446 (1911), holding RUBEROID on roofing material advertised as soft and flexible, but
which was not made of rubber, as descriptive. However, the word "SHALIMAR" is not
a metaphorical implied comparison, nor does it even liken itself to a dissimilar thing, as
in a simile.
142. Charles of the Ritz, 832 F.2d at 1321.
143. Calvin Klein, 824 F.2d at 668.
144. Saxony, 513 F.2d at 722.
145. Charles of the Ritz, 832 F.2d at 1322 (quoting Lois Sportswear U.S.A., Inc.
v. Levi Strauss Co., 799 F.2d 867, 874 (2d Cir. 1986).
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hood that customers may be confused as to the source of the prod-
ucts, rather than as to the products themselves."""6
d. Bridging the Gap
The Charles of the Ritz court went on to consider the other Polar-
oid factors and found that Charles of the Ritz could "bridge the
gap" between the markets in which the two products were sold by
competing in the same market. 147 The court felt that any barriers
between the luxury and discount perfume markets were sufficiently
porous to allow Charles of the Ritz to compete directly with OMNI
in the lower-priced market, especially since the two products could
be found on the same store shelves. 4
e. Actual Confusion
In considering the fifth Polaroid factor, the Charles of the Ritz
court accepted as evidence of actual confusion consumer survey re-
sults. The survey results indicated that consumers did misidentify
packages of OMNI as packages of OPIUM. 49
f. Defendant's Bad Faith
The sixth Polaroid factor was also found to weigh in favor of
Charles of the Ritz. The court found that Deborah had acted in bad
faith because it was aware of OPIUM and intentionally copied the
146. Id. (quoting McGregor-Doniger Inc. v. Drizzle Inc., 599 F.2d 1126, 1134 (2d
Cir. 1979); Springs Mills v. Ultracashmere House, Ltd., 689 F.2d 1127, 1133-34 (2d
Cir. 1982) (emphasis in original)).
147. The district court and the parties agreed that the perfume industry consists of
two markets: "designer" or "luxury" fragrances, which are generally sold in department
stores and boutiques, and "discount" fragrances, which are sold in drugstores and low-
end department stores. Charles of the Ritz, 832 F.2d at 1319.
148. Wholesale distributors of OPIUM sold to discount stores which also sold
OMNI, so both products could appear on the same store shelves. Charles of the Ritz,
832 F.2d at 1319.
149. Charles of the Ritz, 832 F.2d at 1322. In the survey, consumers were shown
extremely brief glimpses of packages of fragrance products using a shadow-box. Thirty-
four percent of the survey of 35 consumers misidentified a package of OMNI as one of
OPIUM. Charles of the Ritz presented the survey results in seeking a preliminary in-junction against the original slogan used by Deborah, "If You Like OPIUM, You'll Love
OMNI." Charles of the Ritz was successful in convincing the court to accept that same
survey as evidence of actual confusion in considering the current slogan. In support of
that inference, "Charles of the Ritz offered evidence that the display was positioned in
one drugstore so that a perfume consumer of average height (5'4") could not read the
disclaimer." Id. In addition, the court noted that the tab still reserves its largest type for
the words Opium and Omni. Id.
"overall image, style, and appearance of OPIUM and its registered
trade dress."'1 50
g. Quality of Defendant's Product
Although the Charles of the Ritz court found that the last two
Polaroid factors lent support to allowing the competitor's use of the
"OPIUM" trademark, those two factors were outweighed by the first
six factors."5' Considering the seventh factor, the court found that
OPIUM is a much higher quality perfume than OMNI; this wide
difference in quality would tend to lessen the likelihood of customer
confusion as to source.152
h. Sophistication of the Buyers
Considering the eighth Polaroid factor, the court thought the high
price charged for OPIUM would force consumers to exercise care in
selecting an OPIUM product. The court found that such a high level
of sophistication in product choice would generally mitigate against
any consumer confusion. 53
Had the Calvin Klein and Saxony courts applied the "factors of
confusion" approach, a balancing of all the factors would also have
lent support to those trademark owners. Under the "surrounding cir-
cumstances" approach, the Calvin Klein court concluded that the
like/love slogan, absent any accompanying source identifying dis-
claimer, created a likelihood of confusion; but the court considered
primarily the strength of the mark and the close relationship be-
tween the products."5 4 That approach reflected the concerns of the
first two Polaroid factors. 55 Yet, the "surrounding circumstances"
approach is incomplete. It fails to discuss "proximity," "bridging the
gap," "actual confusion," "good faith," "quality of the products," or
"level of sophistication.' 56 The "comparative advertising" approach
fails to discuss any of the Polaroid factors and is, therefore, unlikely
150. Id.
151. Id. at 1323.
152. Id. at 1322-23.
153. Id. at 1323.
154. The court also considered the "manner" in which the "OBSESSION" mark
was used by Parfums de Coeur. Calvin Klein, 832 F.2d at 668.
155. The first three Polaroid factors (strength of the mark, similarity, and proxim-
ity) are perhaps the most significant in determining the likelihood of confusion. Mobil
Oil Corp. v. Pegasus Petroleum Corp., 818 F.2d 254, 258 (2d Cir. 1987); Vitarroz v.
Borden, Inc., 644 F.2d 960, 966 (2d Cir. 1981). In mentioning the close relationship of
the products, the Calvin Klein court may have also been considering their proximity as
well as their similarity.
156. "In no case . . . have we determined a senior user's right to injunctive relief
solely on the basis of the similarity of the marks and the proximity of the products. . ..
Since the Polaroid decision, we have consistently considered all the Polaroid factors."
Vitarroz, 644 F.2d at 966.
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to ever result in a finding of likelihood of confusion.
C. Analysis Under the Dilution Doctrine
The dilution doctrine was first introduced into the United States in
the late 1920s and 1930s as an alternative to the traditional "likeli-
hood of confusion" theory of trademark infringement.157 By the
1980s, several states adopted anti-dilution statutes.158 Each state
adopted either the Model State Trademark Act section 12, or a very
similar act. The Model Act provides:
Likelihood of injury to business reputation or of dilution of the distinctive
quality of a mark registered under this Act, or a mark valid at common
law, or a trade name valid at common law, shall be a ground for injunctive
relief notwithstanding the absence of competition between the parties or the
absence of confusion as to the source of goods or services. 159
The dilution doctrine, however, was not adopted into the federal
Lanham Act. 60 The Lanham Act requires a likelihood of confusion
and will not grant protection to a federally registered trademark
under a dilution theory. However, the Lanham Act is not the exclu-
sive remedy for unauthorized use of a trademark.'
1. Background of the Dilution Doctrine
The purpose of the dilution doctrine is to provide protection for
trademarks beyond that provided by the "likelihood of confusion"
test. Despite its wide use in trademark infringement cases, the "like-
lihood of confusion" test offers trademark protection only at the
157. The concept was introduced through the writings and congressional testimony
of Frank Schechter. See Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40
HARV. L. REV. 813 (1927), reprinted in 60 TRADEMARK REP. 334 (1970); see also 2 J.T.
MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 24.13.
158. 2 J.T. MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 24.13.
159. MODEL STATE TRADEMARK BILL § 12 (United States Trademark Ass'n
1964), reprinted in 2 J.T. MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 22.4 at 35.
160. Congress recently rejected an attempt at incorporating antidilution into the
Lanham Act. As introduced, Senator DeConcini's (D-Ariz.) legislation would have cre-
ated a federal cause of action for dilution of "famous" registered marks. However, the
dilution provision was dropped from the Bill. S. 1883, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 134 CONG.
REC. H1O, 411-429 (daily ed. Oct. 19, 1988). "We are particularly disappointed by the
House's decision to eliminate the Federal dilution cause of action." 134 CoNG. REc. S16,
972 (daily ed. Oct. 20, 1988) (statement of Sen. DeConcini).
161. Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act "does not have boundless application as a
remedy for unfair trade practices . . . ." Alfred Dunhill, Ltd. v. Interstate Cigar Co.,
499 F.2d 232, 237 (2d Cir. 1974). "[B]ecause of its inherently limited wording, § 43(a)
can never be a federal 'codification' of the overall law of 'unfair competition.'" 2 J.T.
MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 27.2.
1 127
point where consumer confusion as to the source or sponsorship of
the product becomes likely. However, the dilution doctrine extends
further, granting protection to strong, well-recognized trademarks
even in the absence of confusion.
The dilution doctrine works in one of two ways. First, unautho-
rized use of a trademark may lessen the distinctiveness of the mark;
that is, the use may weaken the mark's propensity to bring to mind
the trademark owner's product.16 2 In this respect, the dilution theory
takes a directly opposite approach from the "likelihood of confusion"
test. The dilution theory assumes that consumers know that the same
trademark is being used by two different manufacturers and is there-
fore less distinctive. This was the theory under which a British court
protected the trademark "Kodak" from use on bicycles. 63 The court
found that although the defendant's use of the mark was unlikely to
mislead consumers into believing the bicycles were in any way asso-
ciated with the camera maker, the use lessened the distinctiveness of
the "Kodak" mark by causing the public to associate it with prod-
ucts other than the cameras of its owner. 6
The second way in which a trademark may be diluted occurs when
its unauthorized use undermines the positive image associated with
the original mark, "tarnishing" its reputation.16 5 Like loss of distinc-
tiveness, tarnishing often occurs when consumers are aware that the
name is being used by two manufacturers. For example, in Steinway
& Sons v. Demars & Friends,"6 the court found that STEIN-WAY
clip-on beer handles linked the prestigious "STEINWAY" piano
mark with a "product incompatible with [its] quality and pres-
tige."10 7 Tarnishing can also occur where consumers cannot distin-
guish the two users of a trademark, and they transfer the bad repu-
tation of one user to the user owning the trademark. 6" If a
trademark is tarnished, consumers no longer associate it with the
162. Comment, supra note 121, at 1089; see also Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Safeway
Discount Drugs, Inc., 675 F.2d 1160, 1168 (11 th Cir. 1982) (dilution occurs when the
use will "lessen the uniqueness" of the mark); Toys "R" Us, Inc. v. Canarsie Kiddie
Shop, Inc., 559 F. Supp. 1189, 1208 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) ("The essence of dilution is the
watering down of the potency of a mark."); Stop the Olympic Prison v. United States
Olympic Comm., 489 F. Supp. 1112, 1123 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) ("'Dilution'. . . refers to a
loss of distinctiveness, a weakening of a mark's propensity to bring to mind a particular'
product . . ").
163. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Kodak Cycle Co., 15 R.P.C. 105 (1898).
164. Id.; see also Comment, supra note 121, at 1086 n.37.
165. See Tiffany & Co. v. Boston Club, Inc., 231 F. Supp. 836, 843-44 (D. Mass.
1964) ("[U]se of the name may detract from the reputation created by the plaintiff
...." "[U]se of plaintiff's unique mark will tarnish plaintiff's trade name by reason of
public dissatisfaction with defendant's product . . . ."). For more on injury to business
reputation, see Comment, supra note 121, at 1090 n.53.
166. 210 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 954 (1981).
167. Id. at 964.
168. See Tiffany, 231 F. Supp. at 843-44.
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quality and prestige previously brought to mind.169
The distinctions made here between lessening the distinctiveness of
the mark and tarnishing the mark, are rarely made by courts apply-
ing the dilution doctrine.17 0 Most often, a case involving loss of dis-
tinctiveness will also involve tarnishing.17 1 Courts focus primarily on
the gradual diminution and whittling away of the value of a
trademark. 7 2
The dilution doctrine can be viewed as another manifestation of
the property theory of trademark rights. 7 3 The doctrine seeks to
protect trademarks even in the absence of confusion or competition.
The doctrine recognizes the value of a trademark to its owner as part
of that owner's product identity or likeness, and suggests that any
other use of that trademark is damaging.
The dilution doctrine, in its beginnings, and arguably today, suf-
fers from a great deal of judicial resistance. 4 Some commentators
see the judicial resistance as hostility to a remedy perceived as ex-
tending "too much legal protection for the trademark.' 75 Other
commentators feel that "the concept [of dilution] has remained so
misunderstood or unpalatable to the judicial taste that it largely has
been ignored by the courts .... 117' But, despite the initial judicial
169. In Tiffany, the retail store was able to obtain an injunction against the use of
"Tiffany's" as the name of a restaurant and lounge. Defendant's use was found to subject
plaintiff's valuable name to the "vagaries of a stranger's business." Id. at 844.
170. One court has defined dilution as use which causes a "gradual diminution of
the mark's distinctiveness, effectiveness and, hence, value. This kind of infringement cor-
rodes the senior user's interest in the trademark by blurring its product identification or
by damaging positive associations that have attached to it." 2 J.T. MCCARTHY, supra
note 3, § 24.13A (citing Ameritech, Inc. v. American Information Technologies Corp.
811 F.2d 960, 965 (6th Cir. 1987) (case remanded for an Ohio common law dilution
charge)). This definition incorporates both loss of distinctiveness and tarnishment.
171. Denicola, Trademarks as Speech: Constitutional Implications of the Emerg-
ing Rationales for the Protection of Trade Symbols, 1982 Wis. L. REv. 158, 181-207.
172. "[T]he boundaries of both the loss of distinctiveness and tarnishment ratio-
nales remain largely uncharted, and even the relationship between the two concepts has
not been significantly explored." Id. at 187.
173. Denicola, supra note 171, at 183.
174. 2 J. T. MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 24.13(B). As a New York court stated,
"while the right has been recognized, the doctrine has been sparingly applied." Cue Pub-
lishing Co. v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 45 Misc. 2d 161, 168, 256 N.Y.S.2d 239, 245
(1965). One court has held that the state dilution law is preempted by the federal Lan-
ham Act. 2 J. T. MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 24.13(B) (citing United States Jaycees v.
Commodities Magazine, Inc., 661 F. Supp. 1360, 1367-68 (N.D. Iowa 1987)).
175. 2 J.T. MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 24.13(B).
176. Pattishall, The Dilution Rationale for Trademark-Trade Identity Protection,
Its Progress and Prospects, 71 Nw. U.L. REV. 618, 621 (1976), reprinted in 67 TRADE-
MARK REP. 607, 610 (1977).
resistance, antidilution statutes remain in effect in many states,177
and the dilution concept has been mentioned in an increasing num-
ber of cases. 7 8
The dilution theory traditionally has been applied only where the
marks are very similar but the products are so dissimilar that there
is no likelihood of confusion as to the products or their sources. 79
Some courts have gone so far as to say that where the parties are in
competition, relief under an antidilution statute is not available.180
Yet, that limitation is not inherent in the doctrine itself. The doc-
trine may protect a mark "notwithstanding the absence of competi-
tion between the parties or the absence of confusion . ". . .'8 More
in line with that wording, other decisions have recognized that collat-
eral use of a trademark by a competitor in comparative advertising
might constitute dilution. 82 For example, in Sykes Laboratory, Inc.
v. Kalvin,83 the defendant marketed its low cost version of plaintiff
Sykes' "Perfect Nail" with the phrase, "The GENERIC BRAND
Version of Sykes' 'Perfect Nail.'" The federal district court held
that the trademark owner could support a claim under the state an-
tidilution statute. The court stated that "[t]his case presents a
unique situation in which the dilution doctrine offers the only hope
for relief to a business whose competitor has adopted its mark in a
way that will not confuse the buying public but could theoretically
threaten the mark's distinctive quality as a selling device."' 84 The
court also found that "[b]y using 'Sykes' Perfect Nail' as the pri-
mary means of identifying their own product, defendants have gone
beyond the comparative advertising at issue in Smith v. Chanel.1'18 5
177. See Pattishall, Dawning Acceptance of the Dilution Rationale for Trade-
mark-Trade Identity Protection, 74 TRADEMARK REP. 289, 290 n.6 (1984); see also 2 J.
T. MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 24.13(D).
178. "Although many of the decisions have not properly applied the law, the exis-
tence of the anti-dilution statutes and doctrine is finally being recognized. More deci-
sional ink appears to have been devoted to dilution during the past five years than the
previous fifty." Pattishall, supra note 177, at 291; see also Century 21 Real Estate Corp.
v. Sandlin, 846 F.2d 1175, 1180 (9th Cir. 1988) ("[U]se of 'Century Investments &
Realty' in the real estate brokerage context could dilute Century 21's distinctive mark.");
Ameritech, Inc. v. American Information Technologies Corp., 811 F.2d 960, 965 (6th
Cir. 1987) ("Plaintiff is entitled to consideration of its dilution claim.").
179. 2 J.T. MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 24.13.
180. Id. § 24.13(A) n.12.
181. MODEL STATE TRADEMARK ACT § 12 (1965) (emphasis added). See Sykes
Laboratory, Inc. v. Kalvin, 610 F. Supp. 849, 856-57 (D.C. Cal. 1985).
182. See 2 J.T. MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 24.13(F) n.17 (citing Clairol, Inc. v.
Cody's Cosmetics, Inc., 353 Mass. 385, 231 N.E.2d 912 (1967)); Chanel, Inc. v. Casa
Flora Co., 100 N.J. Super. 19, 241 A.2d 24 (1968); see also Sykes, 610 F. Supp. at 856-
58.
183. 610 F. Supp. 849 (D.C. Cal. 1985).
184. Id. at 857.
185. Id.
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2. Dilution and the Like/Love Slogan
The like/love cases omit any mention of the dilution concept. Yet,
if a court finds no likelihood of confusion in the use of a trademark
in a like/love slogan, analysis under the dilution concept would be
the next logical step. A trademark owner seeking an injunction for
use of the trademark in a like/love slogan could proceed under the
dilution concept under either of two theories. First, when the com-
petitors use the trademark to sell a copy, they are causing the estab-
lished mark itself to be thought of less as a distinctive brand of per-
fume, and more as a fragrance description, which applies to the
scent of both the copy perfume and the original. 86 The trademark
owner could argue that the unauthorized use lessens the distinctive-
ness of the mark.
Second, by associating the established mark with a lower quality
product, the copiers are "tarnishing" the prestige generally associ-
ated with the mark. If people see OPIUM associated with discount
drug store perfumes, it may lose its prestige, and, as a result, cus-
tomers may be unwilling to pay the expensive perfume prices.
The advertising slogan used in Sykes is comparable to the like/
love slogans, because the like/love advertiser's attempt to foster
goodwill for his or her product "depends entirely on the reputation of
[the trademark owner] ."187 While the Sykes court rejected the
tarnishment theory of dilution,'88 it held that Sykes could maintain
its action on the theory that defendant's "unimpaired reference to
and identification of its own product as a 'version' of plaintiffs may
render Sykes' Perfect Nail a generic term.' ' 89
Similarly, application of the dilution doctrine in the context of
causing the trademark to become a generic term should also be ap-
plicable to like/love slogans. The like/love advertiser is promoting
his product as a version of the trademarked product, thereby threat-
ening the uniqueness and distinctiveness of the trademark. If such
use is continued, it "would create a risk of making a generic or de-
scriptive term of the . . . trademark."'190
Such terms as 'substitute for,' 'made like,' 'similar to' or 'as good as' an-
186. For example, musk brings to mind a deep penetrating fragrance more than it
does any brand such as "Musk for Men."
187. Sykes, 610 F. Supp. at 857.
188. Defendant's borrowing of plaintiff's name did not connote anything unfavor-
able about plaintiff's product or name since that would be counterproductive to their
efforts to sell the generic brand. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 858.
other's trademarked article, though they would appear to be innocolously
descriptive, are normally disingenuously aimed at capitalizing upon the sell-
ing power of another's mark. It should be noted, at the outset, that if com-
petitors can freely misuse a more famous mark, the trademark owner would
be powerless to prevent it from becoming generic. Accordingly, any such
trademark usage by competitors must be viewed with suspicion because it
necessarily involves the inherent risk of dilution.191
Although the dilution concept seems applicable to like/love slo-
gans, its application remains untested in the courts. The primary ob-
stacle that stands in the way of its successful application is removal
of the comparative advertising label. A court must recognize that the
advertiser employs the famous trademark not for presenting mean-
ingful comparative information, but to trade on the reputation of the
famous mark.192
D. Effect of Surrounding Circumstances
The "surrounding circumstances" approach recognizes that, in de-
ciding whether or not the like/love slogans contribute to a likelihood
of confusion, courts "do not focus solely on the 'like/love' slogan but
on the overall context in which that phrase appears."19 For exam-
ple, the court in Saxony concluded that no reasonable consumer
could be confused by the charts, displays, labels, and packaging be-
cause they prominently displayed Saxony as the source of Fragrance
S. The effect of the like/love slogan alone was not even mentioned in
the court's conclusion.
Although the Calvin Klein court expressly stated that a court
should consider the overall context in which the phrase appears, that
court probably provided the most insight into the effect of the like/
love slogan used by itself. That court found that the slogan did invite
consumers to compare; however, by itself, it did not give enough in-
formation to those consumers. The court concluded that if consumers
read only the like/love slogan, they could be left thinking that the
two products were derived from a common source.
The "factors of confusion" approach focuses on the effect of the
like/love slogan itself but does not completely separate the slogan
from the surrounding circumstances. For instance, in finding that
consumers were actually confused, the Charles of the Ritz court
considered evidence regarding the manner of display in a store. The
disclaimer identifying the source of each fragrance was not readily
visible when placed on a relatively high store shelf. The court also
noted the difference in type size between the product names and the
191. Id. (citing 3A R. CALLMANN, supra note 22, § 21.22, at 21-95.).
192. See the discussion in Smith v. Chanel, Inc., 402 F.2d at 568-69 regarding the
potential application of dilution.
193. Calvin Klein, 824 F.2d at 668.
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disclaimer language: the disclaimer was much less visible. The court
was also persuaded by the fact that both products could be found on
the same store shelves. Finally, the similarity in size and appearance
of the imitator's packaging bolstered a finding of likely consumer
confusion.
So advertisers are still left with the unanswered question whether
courts will find use of a like/love slogan to create a likelihood of
confusion. Can they use the slogan, as in the Saxony case, and place
only the advertiser's name on the actual bottles and packages? Or
will they come before a court that believes a like/love slogan that
contains disclaimer language in the slogan itself can create a likeli-
hood of confusion - either because the court feels that disclaimers
are generally ineffective, or because the products appear in the same
stores? It would be unusual for a court to consider the like/love slo-
gan without taking into account the surrounding circumstances, be-
cause the very guidelines for determining if a likelihood of confusion
exists test those surrounding circumstances.""
If one analyzed the like/love slogan in its simplest form, without
any surrounding circumstances, one would probably have to conclude
that the slogan leaves the consumer confused. "If You Like X,
You'll Love Y" tells us that if we like one, we will like them both.
We know that X and Y are different products, but we do not know
how they differ or whether they come from the same producer. Un-
less the manner of display, some disclaimer, or some other source of
information explains how the two products differ, the consumer is
left unsure of the relationship between product X and product Y.
V. APPLICATION OF THE THREE COMPETING POLICIES
Each of the three cases considered here involved a like/love slogan
used to advertise a take-off of a well-known perfume. Yet, no two of
the three decisions came out alike. Each court had its own approach
in analyzing the issues, and each came to a different conclusion. Al-
though the courts stress factual circumstances in support of their de-
cisions, there are only slight factual differences between the cases. In
fact, as noted above, the enjoined slogan in Charles of the Ritz, by
identifying the two manufacturers in the slogan itself, was less likely
to cause confusion than the slogans permitted in Saxony and Calvin
194. The Polaroid factors consider the "proximity" of the products as well as the
"sophistication of the buyers," the "quality of the products," and "actual confusion" of
consumers from seeing the overall surroundings. See supra notes 76-77 and accompany-
ing text.
Klein. It is likely that had either Saxony or Calvin Klein come
before the second circuit, rather than the ninth and eighth circuits,
respectively, their outcomes would have been different. Although
facts always play a very important role in trademark infringement
cases, the courts are interpreting those facts according to policy con-
siderations. It is those differing policy considerations that cause the
courts to decide whether or not the use of a like/love slogan should
be enjoined.
A. The Policies to Protect Property and Prevent Confusion
In contrast, the focus of the Charles of the Ritz court was toward
protecting the trademark owner and the public rather than toward
promoting free competition. Although Charles of the Ritz had the
initial burden to prove a likelihood of confusion, it could do so by
showing a "likelihood that an appreciable number of ordinarily pru-
dent purchasers are likely to be misled, or indeed simply confused,
as to the source of the goods in question. 195 Once confusion was
determined likely, the unauthorized user had the affirmative duty to
come forward with "evidence sufficient to demonstrate that any pro-
posed material would significantly reduce the likelihood of confu-
sion." 198 The competitor, thus, had much heavier burden of demon-
strating a significant reduction in the likelihood of confusion shown
by the trademark owner.
B. The Policy To Promote Free Competition
The Saxony court dismissed, without much discussion, any issues
of likelihood of confusion. The court stated that summary judgment
was proper because the trademark owner never passed the first hur-
dle by setting forth facts to show that a confusion issue even existed.
The court focused on the "obvious inference from the exhibits them-
selves that no reasonable customer could mistake the source of the
advertised goods by believing they were manufactured by
appellant." 9 7  %
The Saxony court decision reflects strong favor for the policy of
promoting competition. The court based its decision on the principle
from Smith v. Chanel that a copier has the right to use a competi-
tor's trademark to identify the product copied. The Smith v. Chanel
court, and courts in similar cases, suggested that the intent of the
party seeking trademark protection was to extend the monopoly of
195. Charles of the Ritz, 832 F.2d at 1321 (emphasis added) (quoting Mushroom
Makers, Inc. v. R.G. Barry Corp., 580 F.2d 44, 47 (2d Cir. 1978) (per curiam)).
196. Id. at 1324 (quoting Home Box Office, Inc. v. Showtime/The Movie Channel,
Inc., 832 F.2d 1311, 1316 (2d Cir. 1987)).
197. Saxony, 513 F.2d at 723.
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the product's trademark to a monopoly of that product itself.198
Those courts anchored themselves in significant public policy favor-
ing a free, competitive economy.199
The Calvin Klein court echoed the reasoning underlying the policy
to promote competition. The court found that a manufacturer may
refer to a competitor's product by name "in order to win over cus-
tomers interested in a lower cost copy of that product, '20 0 unless the
reference is untruthful or likely to confuse customers.
The Calvin Klein court begins with the premise that reference to
another trademark is not infringement. While the trademark owner
always carries the burden to prove a likelihood of confusion, the
court found no error in the district court's finding that "Calvin Klein
failed to show it would probably succeed in demonstrating that
Parfum's store displays would cause likely consumer confusion."20'
In taking that approach, the court is suggesting that free competition
should be allowed unless unauthorized use of a competitor's trade-
mark is clearly confusing.
The policy of free competition guided the Calvin Klein court in
affirming the denial of preliminary injunctive relief. The circuit court
found that the district court clearly did not err when it found that
Calvin Klein failed to show it would probably succeed in demonstrat-
ing that Parfums de Coeur's store displays caused a likelihood of
consumer confusion. Calvin Klein, however, submitted results of a
survey as proof of actual confusion. 2 Yet, the court found that even
if the survey demonstrated some measure of actual confusion, it was
within the district court's discretion to chose not to give the survey
results conclusive weight.
VI. CONCLUSION
The courts have yet to'come up with a consistent approach for
analyzing the like/love cases. Persuasive authority still exists which
proclaims that use of the slogan should be judicially protected as a
form of comparative advertising. Other authorities, however, have
recognized that the slogan is too ambiguous and lacks the necessary
198. Smith, 402 F.2d at 564.
199. Id. at 566.
200. Calvin Klein, 824 F.2d at 668.
201. Id. at 668-69 (emphasis added).
202. Calvin Klein submitted survey results to demonstrate that the information on
the spray cologne package was insufficient to dispel possible consumer confusion as to the
source of CONFESS. Calvin Klein, 1 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1156, 1158 (1987).
information to be considered comparative. While the two later cases,
Calvin Klein and Charles of the Ritz, recognized the likelihood of
confusion created by the slogan, neither gave any clear indication of
what information is necessary to sufficiently dispel any confusion.
New judicial ground remains to be explored because there is still the
possibility that future courts will consider the damage to well-known
trademarks used in like/love slogans under the expanding doctrine of
dilution.
Of the three analytical approaches considered here, the "compara-
tive advertising" approach, the "surrounding circumstances" ap-
proach, and the "factors of confusion" approach, the "factors of con-
fusion" approach provides the most complete analysis. The Polaroid
factors have long been established as the most acceptable means for
determining if likelihood of confusion exists. The approach provides
an objective analysis, taking into account all of those variables that
work together to create confusion.
Yet, whichever doctrine is applied, the likelihood of confusion doc-
trine or the dilution doctrine, and whichever analytical approach is
taken, the analysis of a like/love slogan is not isolated from the ef-
fects of underlying policy considerations. For it is the policy consid-
erations underlying the entire theory of trademark protection which
cause a court to give more weight to one doctrine or another, and
which eventually lead the courts to their final determination.
Notwithstanding a court's stand on policy considerations, courts in
future cases should consider more seriously the effect of the like/love
slogan by itself. In placing too much focus on the surrounding cir-
cumstances that lessen the confusion created by the slogan, the
courts are ignoring the reality that consumers focus on headlines and
rarely read the fine print. Consumers often only see "If You Like X,
You'll Love Y," and base their purchase decisions on their own in-
terpretation of that slogan. Since the slogan may be interpreted to
state either that the products are competitors, or that the products
are alternatives produced by the same manufacturer, the slogan is
confusing. The end result is that consumers may buy a product mis-
takenly believing that it is manufactured by a company that in real-
ity, has no association with that product.
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